

# The Big Slow Curve


Has It Shaped our Lives?

Tom Abel


# The Big Slow Curve

- I was interested in the 'social' impact of oil production
- Obviously oil impacts economic production in every way
- But what about attitudes, happiness, political persuasion, public policy, social structure, etc
- Can we detect changes in these kinds of behaviors of the 'oil years' and relate them to the oil trajectory?
- That was my goal, and the main point is probably the tables at the end



# 2-Source



- Here is 2-source, a little different than usual because I also graphed 'Net Production'
- The obvious candidate for a change in attitudes would be the 'inflection' point on the gross production curve
- But I thought that another candidate might be peak 'net production'
- No big deal, either one is not bad as an approximate date of 'attitude transition'



- So to put the oil curve on there, and to add approximate 'years'
- So peak NP is about 1978 and the GP inflection point is about 1970
- But these dates are very rough
- And the 'data' in the next table is very 'gross', and also subjective
- But still, something to think about



# Pre- and Post-NP Peak

<u>Pre-NP Peak</u>	<u>Post-NP Peak</u>
<p>Construction boom – heavy industrial production            Use of local matching assets            Money movement facilitates production</p>	<p>Accelerating consumption or decay of buildings, roads, etc.            Secondary production – imported raw materials            Money movement is less productive</p>
<p>Structural reorganization and social mobility            Open new niches            Expand bureaucracies            Expand government responsibility and regulation            Expand social welfare initiatives            Democratic socialism</p>	<p>Structural rigidity            Closing classes            Racism and Ethnicism            Increasing gap between rich and poor            Increasing surveillance and other control measures            Curtail national government responsibility, deregulation            and privatization            Social welfare “reforms”            “Third way” centrism</p>
<p>Conservative → Liberal ideology</p>	<p>Liberal → Conservative ideology            Fundamentalism            Revitalization movements</p>
<p>Large families</p>	<p>Shrinking families</p>
<p>Expansion in space            Cover landscapes            World-system (economic) expansion            Colonial expansion            Wars of conquest, World Wars</p>	<p>Spatial consolidation            Solidifying world-system controls            Violent domination            Regional rigidity and division of labor</p>
<p>Confidence, optimism</p>	<p>Loss of confidence, insecurity</p>

# Peak Storage and After

- Ha! Notice that I included 'revitalization movements' under Post-NP Peak
- That could include PWD, as I said in the other Ppt, if we are not careful
- The next table is related to 'storage peak' (in both graphs) which would be the point at which the built environment is depleting faster than it can be maintained, at about 2030, but these dates are *very weak*
- I only filled in the extreme 'bad' version, leaving the opposite end (a prosperous way down) empty, referring to the book (too lazy to summarize), and then suggesting that there are a number of alternative scenarios located in between those extremes

# Peak Storage and After

<b>Peak Storage and After Scenarios (Post-D)</b>			
<b>Scenario 1 Prosperous Way Down (PWD)</b>	<b>Scenario 2</b>	<b>Scenario 3</b>	<b>Scenario 4 Blade Runner Dystopia</b>
(See book)			Spatial decomposition and reorganization Physical decomposition and reorganization Political decentralization
			Ethnic crisis and conflict
			Resource wars
			Enclave economies



**The End**